Volume 24

Issue 1

4-1920

Dickinson Law Review - Volume 24, Issue 7

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
Dickinson Law Review - Volume 24, Issue 7, 24 DICK. L. REV. 189 ().
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol24/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

Dickinson Law Review
Vol XXIV.

APRIL, 1920

BUSINESS MANAGERS
George J. Fliegelman
Edison Hedges
Jozeph Handler
Paul E. Beaver

No. 7

EDITORS
John E. Brenneman
Donald B. Rockwell
John N. Moorhead
Thomas D. Caldwell

Sui.acrtian Price 41.50 Per Year

LOCAL LEGISLATION
Legislation Applicable to Some Members Only of a Class
Legislation for certain members of a class which is
not applicable to other members of that class is deemed
local and void. A specimen is an act which legislated for
cities of the fifth class which are situate in counties of
more than 60,000 inhabitants, by providing that court
should be held in such cities, though they were not the
county seat. It was unconstitutional, because applying
to some cities only of the fifth class.1 An act applicable
only to Philadelphia though describing it under the general name cities of the first class, is unconstitutional.
The Act of May 24, 1893, entitled an act to abolish the
commissioners of public buildings, and to place all public buildings heretofore under the control of such commissioners, under the control of the department of public works in cities of the first class," can never apply to
any other city than Philadelphia, should such other
city come into existence within the class. It is therefore
void.2 The Act of May 23, 1889 constitutes each city of
the third class hereafter incorporated a separate school
district, and provides for the election of school conIScowden's Appeal, 96 Pa. 422.
2Perkins vs. Philadelphia, 156 Pa. 554,
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trollers, the levy and collection of taxes, etc. It provides
that any city of the third class now incorporated may
accept and become subject to the act by resolution of
the school boards of such cities. The result is that the
third class cities were divided into those already incorporated and those thereafter to be incorporated. To the
former, the act did not apply unconditionally. It was
local and void." The Act of May 23, 1889, concerning
cities of the third class, is not local and unconstitutional
because its provisions are not to apply to cities of that
class which existed prior to 1874 and have not acceipted
the provisions of the Act of May 23, 1874' concerning
cities of the third class. The Act of June 14, 1887 concerning the government of cities of the second class,
contains some provisions Which could be applied only to
cities of that class, then in existence, or coming into existence before certain designiated dates. One of its provisions was that on and after the first Monday of April,
1888, councils should be composed of one member -from
each ward; another was that on the third Tuesday of
February, 1889, the qualified voters of each ward
should elect one select councilmhn, etc. The existence of
these provisions does not nMake the act, though they are
effectual only as to Pittsburgh, local and unconstitutional.' When a change in the constitution of cities of the
second class is made, and the statute requires the Sppointment with-in 30 days of a recorder in each of the
existing cities of the class, the fact that this provision
cannot apply to cities of that class that may have later
entered into it, does not make the statute unconstitutional. It is said that the objection to the act is not that
it makes provision for existing cities, but that it makes
none for those which later enter the class.,
gCommonwealth vs. Reynolds, 137 Pa. 389.
'Harrs' Appeal, 160 Pa. 494.

$Pittsburghi's 'Petition, 188 Pa. 427.
ACommonwealth vs. Moir, 199 Pa. 534.
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Unimportance of Motive of Legislature.
The wish and intention of the legislature,in enacting
a law ,to reach one particular city, do not make the law
local, if it is conceived in such terms as to cover any
cities that may later enter the class. "Suppose ,they
did (perceive," says the court, "that Philadelphia was
the only city falling within the first class, and Pittsburgh the only one in the second, yet the motive influencing that classification cannot be inquired into.
If the power to classify for wise purposes exists, that
ends the matter.7 If, 'however, the legislation is so conceived -that it cannot apply to more than one city, already in existence, its general form will justify the
opinion that it is an attempt to evade the constitution."
Only One or Few Subjects in the Class.
A class which contains, at the time of its formation, and which for a considerable time thereafter will
contain, only one individual, is not for that reason,
invalid. Paxson, J., remarks that Adam "was as distinctly a class" when created as was the class man at
any subsequent period. That Philadelphia was the only
member of the first class in 1874, did not vitiate the
class, for the reason apparently, that other cities, e. g.,
Pittsburgh might at some time, enter that class. "Legislation is intended," suggests Paxson, J., "not only to
meet the wants of the present, but to provide for the
future. * * * * * It is intended to be permanent. At no
distant day Pittsburgh will probably become a city of
the first class, and Scrianton, or other of the rapidly
growing interior towns, will take the place of the city
lKilgore vs. Magee, 85 Pa. 401.
sPerkins vs P.hiladelphia, 156 Pa. 554.
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of Pittsburgh, as a city of the second class." 9 The ,possibility that other cities or counties will enter the class
without change of the law is deemed essential to the
validity of the clasification. A law providing for the
affairs of counties which are conterminous with cities
of the first class, e. g., providing for the election of a
board of revision of taxes in such counties, is unconstitutional, because there is no existing law by which any
other county than Philadelphia can become conterminous with a city.20 Nor, is -a mere possibility that othef
individuals will enter a class, sufficient to make the
class valid if Mestrezat, J.'s view is sound. Speaking of
a law providing for the annexation of two contiguous
cities in the same county, (the only two then in existence being Pittsburgh and Allegheny city), he observes
"With a knowledge of the facts, known to the legislature as well as to the courts, this is not within the
range of probability but a possibility so remote that it
must be excluded from consideration in determining the
constitutionality of the statute."' The fact that the law
applies now to one county, is no objection to it, if in the
natural progress of events, under the existing law,
others may grow into the class. 12 The Act of June 2,
1901, P. L. 607 providing for a review of the proceedings
of township road commissioners in laying out, opening
and vacating roads, is not unconstitutional because at
the time of its enactment it applied only to 37 town9

Wheeler vs. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. 338. It is said that a class
can be formed of cities, although there is at yet, no individual to
compose it. Instead of taking 300,000 as the minimum of population of cities of the first class, the Act of 1874 might have
taken a million although no city, at that time, had that population; Kilgore vs. Magee, 85 Pa. 401.
10 Blankenburg vs. Black, 200 Pa. 629; Sample vs. Pittsburgh,

212 Pa. 533; Perkins vs. Philadelphia, 156 Pa. 554; Kilgore -v.
Magee, 85 Pa. 401.
"Sample vs. Pittsburgh, 212 Pa. 533.
12Blankenburg vs. Black, 200 Pa. 629.
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ships in Bradford county, five in Sullivan and one in
Lycoming county, because it is capable of applying to
the proceedings of any commissioners in other townships should such, come into existence. 3
Act Assimilating the Law in one Place to the
Law.

General

An act is not to be deemfed unconstitutionally local,
though in form local, if its effect is to obliterate a local
law and to extend the law operative elsewhere, to the
locality. The first section of the Act of May 6, 1887,
P. L. 87., makes it the duty of viewers of any public plotted street in any city of the first class if they decide in
favor of opening or widening such street, to endeavor to
procure from property owners, releases from all damages where they fail to procure such releases, to estimate the damages.
This act virtually repeals the local system and extends the provisions of the general law, relating to the
duty of viewers appointed to lay out streets, to those
appointed to open streets laid out and plotted by the
city. It thus accomplishes uniformity, and is .general."
If certain counties are under a duty to take care of the
poor who have no known legal settlement within the
state, an act, that is, the Act of March 6, 1903, P. L. 18,
which imposes a similar duty upon all the other counties works no diversity, but uniformity, and is not local and unconstitutional.1
3

.Earl vs. Ryan, 41 Super. 448.
URaun Street, 12 Pa. 257.
25Poor District vs. Lawrence, 222 Pa. 358.

2
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Uniformity of Result Not a Test
Uniformity is not itself a substantive requirement
of the Constitution, but one of the judicial tests of generality as opposed to localism and specialism.'
Continuance of Exceptions.
It is not the continuance of existing exceptions to
a general law, but the creation of new ones, which is
unconstitutional. 17 Reading had a special water-system,
prior to becoming a city of the third class. It accepted
the Act of May 23, 1874, and thus became a
city of the third class. It is now governed
therefore by the Act of May 23, 1889, relating to cities of the third class. Section 2 of Article 12 ot
that act says that any city which now has title to any
water, gas or electric light works, by conveyance to the
same in its corporate name, is empowered to create a
departmzent to be called the water and lighting deipartment. At the time of the passage of the Act of 1889
there was a city of the third class, Erie, had
water works the title to which was in the name of its
commissioners of water-works, under the provisions of
the special Act of April 4, 1867; P. L. 768. Mitchell, C.
J., concludes that the Act of 1889 with respect to
water works did not cover the city of Erie, but even if
the Act of .1889 did not affect the system of Erie it
was not for that reason unconstitutional. A repeal of
the local act would at any time bring Erie into full
conformity with the general system. The second section of Article 12 of bhe Act of 1889 is not therefore
unconstitutional.8
vCommonwealth vs. Middleton, 210 Pa. 582; Commonwealth

vs. Heller, 219 Pa. 65; Commonwealth vs. Moir, 199 Pa. 534;
Poor 7District vs. Lawrence County, 222 Pa. 358.
3 Evans vs. Phillipi, 117 Pa. 226; fReading vs. Savage, 124
Pa. 328; Commonwealth vs. Heller, 2-1:9 Pa. 65.
2sCommonwealth vs. Heller, 219 Pa. 65.
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Instances of Permissible Local Laws.
Legislation concerning the public health in a sense
may be local. The location of hospitals in built up portions of cities may be prevented. 19 An act forbidding the
purchase by junk dealers of pipes, faucets, etc., unless
they make an entry in the book of person selling, and
of the thing purchased, although confined to cities is
valid.20 The Act of July 2, 1895 to regulate and license
public .Ridginghouses in the different cities of the state,
which makes a violation of its provisions criminal, is
constitutional. 21 The Act of June 7, 1901, relating to
plumbing and drainage in cities of the second class is
a valid exercise of the police 'power.22 Making it criminal
to prosecute the business of an undertaker in cities
without procuring a license, is not improper. Such a law
2 3
may be necessary in cities, and not so in other places.
The Act of May 3, 1909, requiring proper exits and fireescapes to buildings elsewhere than in cities of the first
2
and second classes, is local but permissible. '
Partial Repeal of General Law.
The constitution forbids the General Assembly's
indirectly enacting a local law by the partial repeal of
a general law. Prior to the Act of May 28, 1907, a special
law gave to the county treasurer of Montgomery and
another to the county appraiser of Allegheny county
'sCommonwealth vs. Hospital, 108 Pa. 270, Shafer, J., says
that the law is not local.
2OCommonwealth vs. Mintz, 19 Super. 283.
2
'Commonwealth vs. Muir, 1 Super. 578; 180 Pa. 47. The localness of the act is not considered.
22Beltz vs. Pittsburgh, 211 Pa. 561.
23
Commonwealth vs. Ha nley, 15 Super. 271.
2
ARoumfort Co. vs..Delaney, 230 Pa. 374. There is a presumption that the notice of the intention to obtain the passage of the
act was given. But if it were conceded that no notice had been
given, the act would be void. Chalfant vs. Edwards, 173 Pa. 246.
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the power to collect state and county taxes. The Act of
1907 enacted that no taxes in townships of the first
class should be collected except by the township treasurer. This repealed the local statute so far as townships of
the first class in Allegheny and Montgomery are concerned. The Act of May 1, 1909, substitutes for the second section of the Act of 1907 a provision that nothing
in the Act (of 1907) shall take away or interfere with the
powers and duties imposed upon the treasurer of any
county by existing laws, (that is, laws existing when
the Act of 1907 was passed), in relation to the collection by such treasurer of state and county taxes. The
effect of this was to restore the special laws applicable
to the two counties. The Act of 1909 therefore is a
partial repeal of the general law of 1907, whereby the
prior special acts are indirectly re-enacted, and is
5
therefore void.2
Police Regulations.
Legislation may prohibit wooden buildings in cities
or boroughs or in parts of cities or boroughs. The general assembly may authorize cities or boroughs to prohibit such buildings altogether or in parts of their
areas. 2 The Act of May a, 1909, P. L. 417, requiring fireescapes and other devices to lessen the dangers incident
to fires, in all parts of the state except cities of the first
and second class is a police regulation, which is not objectionable because it is local. It is a state regulation, its
provisions are enforced by state officers. The chief factory inspector and his deputies are employed to enforce
it. Through them, the state, not any county or city or
township acts. 2T
2-Cornman vs. Ragginbotham, 227 Pa. 649.
26Klingel vs. Bickel, 117 Pa. 326.

27 ,oumfort Co. vs. Delaney, 230 Pa. 374.
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Taxation.
The Act of June 25, 1885, "regulating the collection of taxes in the several boroughs and townships"
of the staterequires the schooldirectors therein to issue
their warrants to the tax collector of the borough or
township. This act is valid although it does not apply
in boroughs or townships having a special law, e.g., Act
of April 21, 1869, requiring the warrant to issue to
the treasurer of the school board, 28 that is, the Act of
1885 is not void because applicable to school districts
in boroughs and townships only, or because it is not
applicable to such of these as -have special laws. Under
the Act of 1885, the borough tax collector, receiving
warrants from the proper authorities for the
collection of county, school, poor, water and sinking
fund taxes may proceed to sell the real estate which
is taxed, if necessary. 29 Under this
act the
township tax collector may compel by mandamus the
delivery to him by the county commissioners of the
duplicate of county and state taxes.3 0 The Act of May
28, 1907, which abolishes the office of township tax
collector in townships of the first class, and which requires the township treasurer in such townships to collect all the taxes, including state and county, is not local and is constitutional.31 The Act of February 27,
1860, applicable to Allegheny city made the city treasurer the collector of taxes. The Act of March 22, 1877,

applicable to cities of the second class, furnished a separate collector of taxes. Although Allegheny city so
2&Bvans vs. Phillipi, U1*7 Pa. 226.
29Bennet vs. Hunt, 148 Pa. 257.
8QCommonwealth vs. Lyter, 162 Pa. 50.
32
Cornman vs. Hagginbotham, 227 Pa. 549. There is a distinction between an act which attempts to regulate the collection of, taxes and one which attempts to formulate a method by
which a lien for taxes may be created.
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long as it was of the third class continued under the
Act of 1860, so soon as it passed into the second class,
it fell under the operation of the Act of 1877, in respect to the officer who was to collect taxes and to the
mode in which the taxes were to be paid. Hence the
city treasurer could not be compelled by mandamus to
32
receive payment of the taxes.
Granting Special Privileges to Corporations.
Local or special laws granting to any corporation,
association or individual any special or exclusive privilege or imnimunity, are forbidden by the Constitution.
Municipal corporations are not embraced by the word
corporation. Legislation which confers upon municipalities powers and privileges relating to municipal affairs, while denying such powers to individuals and
,private corporations, is not, for that reason, unconstitutional.33
Granting Powers and Privileges Procurable Under General Law
The Act of May 3, 1909, which relates to the furnishing of proper exits, fire escapes, etc., to buildings
except such as are in cities of the first and second class,
confers no such privilege."
Magistrates and Justices of the Peace.
The passing of local or special laws, regulating the
practice or jurisdiction of, or changing the rules of evidence in any judicial ,proceedings or inquiry before aldermen or justices of the peace, is prohibited. The Act

2Commonwealth vs. MacFerron, 152 Pa. 244.
33

.Commonweath vs. Emmers, 221 Pa. 298. cf. Commonwealth
vs. Vroman, 164 Pa. 306; Clark's Estate, 195 Pa. 520.
3
'Roumfort Co. vs. Delaney, 230 Pa. 374.
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of July 7, 1879, which enlarges the civil jurisdiction of
justices of the peace to $300, except magistrates in
"cities of the first class" is not local or special.
The phrase "cities of the first class" is taken to
mean Philadelphia alone, and since the constitution itself provides that in Philadelphia there shall be magistrates, whose jurisdiction shall not exceed $100, it impliedly warrants legislation on this subject, that shall
be applicable only to the rest of the sTate.8'
Creating Corporations.
Local or special laws, creating corporations, or
amending,. renewing, or extending their charters, is
forbidden by the constitution. The Act of March 19,
1879, providing for the incorporation of -street 'railway
companies in cities of the second and third classes, is
local and void.36 The power to classify portions of the
state with respect to the incorporation of corporations,
probably does not exist. The Act of May 5, 1876, which
provides for the appointinent of commissioners to select
a site and build a hospital, and, upon the completion of
the hospital, to surrender their trust to a board of
managers "who shal be a body politic or corporate by
the name and style of the Trustees of the State Hospital for the Insane of the Southeastern Part of Pennsylvania," creates probably, a special conmission, or
agency rat-her than a corporation of the prohibited
kind.3 7 An act not designed directly to extend the powers of a corporation, but to increase the utility of
streets, as highways, will not be unconstitutional, if,
as the latter, it would be valid, The Act of May 8, 1876,
gives to passenger railways in cities of the first class
the right to use other than ani.nlal power, whenever
they are authorized to do so by the city councils. "The
3
Wilkes-Barre
36

vs. Meyers, 113 Pa. 395.
Weinman vs. Wilkinsburg, Etc. Rwy. Co., 118 Pa. 192.
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control of the vehicles," says Mtchell, J., "that shall
be used on the public streets for the general conveyance
of passengers, the rate of speed and the motive power
by which they shall be propelled, is equally (as the
lighting of streets) or even more peculiarly the subject
of municipal duty. In fact, public conveyances, whether
ferry boats, barges, hackney coaches or omnibuses,
have been subjects of police regulation and license,
as long as they have been known or used in Pennsylvania. The Act of 1876 is therefore upon a subject proper
for municipal classification and is a general law. * * * *
That incidentally it has effected and enlarged the
charters of certain railway corporations, does not vitiate
it as an exercise of unquestionable police power over
subjects within their proper province."38 But, if powers
can be added by local acts, to corporations which use the
streets, it is hard to see why, for the facilitating of the
use of the streets for conveyance, local acts might not
incorporate companies to furnish the needful vehicles
and service.
Authorizing Creation, Extension

Impairing of Liens.

The passing of local laws authorizing the creation,
extension or impairing of liens, is prohibited by the constitution. An act in relation to cities of the second
class, providing for the levy, collection and disbursement of taxes and water rents, which provides that all
taxes and water rents, filed as liens in default of payment, shall be liens on the real estate, whether the real
owner is named or not, and a sale upon the same as
-7Commonwealth vs. Philadelphia, 193 Pa. 236. In any case,
the corporate status could not be collaterally attacked. cf. Weinman vs. Wilkinsburg, Etc. Rwy. Co., 118 Pa. 192.
aBReeves vs. Philadelphia Traction Co., 152 Pa. 153.
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against the party assessed, shall vest a good title in the
purchaser thereof offends this prohibition39
An act, that of June 0, 1881, makes taxes on land
whether county, township, poor, school or municipal, a
lien, which does not apply to cities of the first and second classes, but extends only to townships, boroughs and
cities of the third class, is local and unconstitutional. °
Had it applied only to municipal taxes, it would possibly
have been held valid, '%ut," says Williams, J., "the collection of a county tax is not a municipal purpose. The
same thing may be said of school and poor taxes. Classification has been upheld for municipal purposes only.
Legislation for a class of cities is only general (it might
be said, also, legislation for cities, all cities) and
valid under our constitution, wihen it relates to some
municipal purpose." In the county of Allegheny, the
collection of unpaid county taxes falls under the Act
of 1881, so far as townships, boroughs and. cities of the
third class are concerned. In the cities of Pittsburgh and
Allegheny (of -the second class) they do not. Thus two
different methods are in force within the limits of the
same county for dealing with county, school, poor and
municipal taxes." The Act of June 27, 1883, which provides for the issue of a scire facias upon a municipal lien
in cities of the first class and makes such issue a continuance of the lien for five years therefrom, not
withstanding the previous issue of a scire facias which
has not been brought to judgment within five years of
its issue, is local and void. 4 1 The lien was for water
pipes. The laying of water pipes, the acquisition
of a lien
therefore might well be regarded
a municipal affair. "Being local, however, it is,"
' Safe Deposit Etc. Co. vs. Fricke, 1,52 Pa. 231; McKay vs.
Trainor, 152 Pa. 242.
4oVamLoon vs. Engle, 171 Pa. 157.
4
lPhiladelphia vs. Haddington M. E.' Church, 115 Pa. 291.
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says Gordon, J., "unconstitutional." It is in "direct conflict with the supreme law of the comwonwealth." On
the other hand, we are told that since the grading and
paving of -streets is clearly and exclusively a subject of
municipal control, the power to collect the cost thereof
is a municipal power. Hence the twenty-second section
c.f Article 15 of the Act of May 23, 1889, concerning
cities of the third class Which provides for filing a lien
for the cost of paving a street, the issue of a sci fa,
thereon, the giving of ,priority to such lien is valid.
"This," says Williams. J., "is the method provided tfor
collecting similar assessments in cities of the first and
second classes. It is not the introduction of a new, but
an adoption of an old and well understood mode of procedure to secure the city and give notice of the incumbrance.'42 The Act of April 23, 1889, authorizing liens in
boroughs, for a portion of the cost of paving streets,
and a supplementary act, of March 31, 1897, were assumed to be constitutional, notwithstanding the localness of the provisions. 43 Mechanics liens are clearly not
a municipal affair. An act providing for such liens on
leaseholds, which does not apply to counties having a
population of over 200,000 inhabitants is local and void. 4"
Creating Offices.
Local or special laws creating offices, or prescribing the powers and duties of officers, in counties, cities,
boroughs, townships, election or school districts, are
42Scranton vs. White, 148 Pa. 419. The provision that the
lien shall last for ten years without revival, may be open to
criticism, but even if void, the lien would be good for the usual
period of five years.
43New Brighton Borough vs. 'Biddell, 14 Super. 207; 201 Pa.

96.
4'Davis vs. Clark, 106 Pa. 877. The Act of June, 1895, authorizing a trustee to obtain a surety company as surety and to
pay the company, does 6ot create a lien.
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prohibited by the constitution. Local acts regulating the
affairs of counties, etc., are also prohibited. The officers
therein would for the most part, have to do with affairs" thereof. The two prohibitions therefore largely
coincide. The Act of June 2, 1881, to make taxes on real
estate a first lien and to provide for the collection thereof, but excepting cities of the first, second and fourth
classes, violates a clause of the constitution in ques5
tion.
Regulating Mining.
An act which-distinguishes the anthracite and the bituminous coal districts, and which defines and regulates certain forms of mining in the former," or in the
latter,' is not local and unconstitutional.
Regulating Trade.
The Act of June 7, 1895, which requires persons
who conduct the business of embalming dead bodies
and undertaking to procure a license, and which is operative only in cities, oes not violate the constitutional
prohibition of local laws regulating trade. It is not a
mere trade regulation. Its paraimount object is to pro-.
tect the public health. Its effect upon the right of persons to prosecute a business is only incidental. So, a
law requiring physicians in cities to report deaths is
45WanLoon vs. Engle, 171 Pa. 157 cf. Straub vs. Pittsburgh,
Pa. 356. The Act of June 2, 1681, P. L. 44, makes it the duty
MSS
of county auditors to settle the accounts of the directors of
the poor and of the treasurer and steward of every poor house
within a county where a poor house Is, provided that the act
shall not apply to any poor district the territory of which is not
co-extensive with the county, except upon the petition of at
least 20 citizens, residents of such township praying for an
audit. It was not decided whether this was local and unconstitutional; Nason vs. Poor Directors, 126 Pa. 445.
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valid, although it does not operate within townships or
boroughs.' 8
Relating to Cemeteries.
Local or special laws relating to cemeteries or
graveyards are forbidden by the Constitution. The Act
of June 8, 1891, makes it unlawful to establish any
cemetery wifthin one mile from a city of the first class,
the drainage of which empties into any stream from
which the water supply of such city is in whole or part
obtained. It is unconstitutional. It is not a provision for
cities of the first class, because the stream, the cemetery, are outside of such city.49 The Act of June 6, 1893,
P. L. 342, authorizing the taking and occupancy of certain public burial places, under certain circumstances
for purposes of common school education is local and
unconstitutional.. It was passed for a particular case, to
enable a particular school board to take a part of a particular cemetery after a professedly special law for the
same object had been vetoed by the governor. 50
Laying Out, Opening, Maintaining of Roads.
All legislation involves classification. If the law
punishes theft, or arson, or murder, it first classifies
these acts and then ordains different consequences of
them. Turnpikes, railroads, plank-roads, may be distinguished from each other. Turnpikes themselves may
be classed into those which have and those which have
not been appropriated or condemned for public use. free
AIDurkin vs. Kingston Coal Co., 171 Pa. 193.
' 7Commonwealth vs. Jones, 4 Super. 362; Read vs. Clearfield
County, 12 Super. 419.
AWCommonwealth vs. Hanley, 15 Super. 271.
'RPhiladelphia vs. Cemetery Co., 162 Pla. 105.
BOCty of York School District's Appeal, 169 Pa. 70.
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of tolls, and those the damages from whose condemnation have or have not been paid by the proper county.
An act, 51 confined in its operation to those which
have been condemned, and the damages -for which have
been paid, may provide that such road shall be properly
r~paired and maintained at -the expense of the county,
city or borough in which it lies. The mere fact that local results may be produced through the operation of
the act ,does not make in unconstitutional. A law may
by classification or. otherwise, produce diversity of results, and yet be general when the classification is
based on a real distinction52 The Act of June 26, 1895,
P. L. 336, provides for the improvement of roads, and
for the imposing of the care and maintenance of improved roads upon the county. The operation of the act
on any highway depends upon the initiative of the commissioners of the county in which it lies. This, however,
does not make the act local or special.13
Acts Partially Void
Acts may contain provisions which are separable
from each other, and the invalidity of one of which,
because it is local or special, will not involve the voidness of the rest.54 On the other hand, the vice of unconstitutionality may affect the entire act, e. g.,
the Act of May 24, 1887, which made seven classes of
cities, was wholly bad.5 5 -The Act of April 11, 1876, P.
5'Act of April 20, 1905, P. L. 237.
5zCommonwealth vs. Bowman, 35 Pa. 410.
53Middletown Road, 15 Super. 167.

5&Commonwealth vs. Moir, 199 Pa. 534.
55
Ayar's Appeal, 122 Pa. 266.
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L. 20, classifying cities into five classes, was wholly
bad. Sterrett, J., remarked, "There is no answer to the

crowning vice of unnecessary and excessive classifiration which stands out in bold relief on the face of both
acts (that of 1876 and 1887) and of which. nearly all
the provisions are predicated. These acts doubtless contain many wise and wholesome provisions, but they are
so interwoven with and dependent upon others that are
unconstitutional and void that neither of the Acts of
1876 and 1887 can be sustained even in part."56

"Meadville City vs. Dixon, 129 Pa. 1.
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MOOT COURT
HUDSON vs. X, ADMINISTRATOR OF JUDSON
Constitutional Law-Full Faith and Credit--Foreign and Domestic Administrators--Judgment Obtained in One State as
a Basis for an Action in Another State-Suit Against One
Person Administrator in Two States.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Judson died in Maryland, leaving property in that state and
also in Pennsylvania. X became administrator in both states.
Judson sued X as administrator 'in Maryland for a debt and recovered a judgment for $400. After obtaining payment of $200
from the Maryland assets he sued X in this state, as a Pennsylvania administrator, and offered the Maryland judgment as a
basis for his action. The defendant denies the debt.
Kelsey for Defendant.
Surran for Plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
GOELTZ, J.-The question involved is as to the validity of
the judgment of a sister state when used as a basis for an action
in this state. The Constitution of the United States, Article 4,
Section 1, says that "full faith and credit shall be given in
each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of
every other state." The courts of this state have always construed this to mean in regard to judgments that the defendant
in an action on a foreign judgment might show lack of jurisdiction of the foreign court, but might not inquire into the merits
of the judgment after it is once given. Price vs. Schaoffer, 161
Pa. 630.
The case of Hare vs. O'Brien, 233 Pa. 330, relied upon by the
planitiff in this case as authority for his claim containz an exhaustive argument as to the rights of domiciliary administrators
and executors to sue out judgments in other states, and Justice
Mestrezat said in the dicta in that case that "an administrator
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sueing in a foreign state occupies the same position as a private
person, and the bringing of the suit in the name of the administrator is mere surplusage, and is unnecessary."
The contention of the counsel for the defendant that the use
of the Maryland judgment as a basis for an action in Pennsylvania will necessitate a plea for a judgment of $400 in Pennsylvania is error, as a partly satisfied judgment may be proceeded
upon until fully satisfied. The fact that the judgment was
partly satisfied in a foreign jurisdiction makes no difference. The
plea of nil debet puts in issue the very existence of the debt, and
the defendant is estopped from making this plea here, as that
would be, in effect, a denial of the full faith and credit which we
must give to the judgments of our sister state. 9 S. and R. 252.
T'he length to which our courts have gone in upholding this
full faith and credit clause of the Constitution is shown by the
decision of the court in Curran vs. Rowley, 2 Pa. C. C. 539, in
which the plaintiff sought to recover on a judgment granted by
a justice of the peace in Ohio, and in which the defendant interposed the defense that the judgment was not that of a court
of record. It was held that full faith and credit must be accorded this judgment of a sister state.
The case before us falls clearly under the provision of the
Constitution, and therefor it remains only to follow the law as
it has been construed under this provision, and judgment is
therefor rendered for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME CO'URT.
The Constitution of the United States requires that in
Pennsylvania full faith and credit shall be given to a Maryland
judgment, that is, that the judgment )shall in Pennsylvania, be
treated as being as conclusive of the rights and obligations of
the parties, as it is in Maryland.
A judgment against an administrator in Maryland does not
decide that he owes the -money, unconditionally, but only that he
owes so much of it, as the assets in his hands will make it possible to pay. The assets in his hands are the Maryland assets.
The judgment ascertains no duty with respect to the Pennsylvania assets, over which he has no control, and is hence conclusive of nothing with respect thereto. Nay, not only is it not
conclusive, it is not even evidence of any duty with respect to
the Pennsylvania administration. In Johnson vs. Powers, 139
U. S. 156, Gray, J., says, "A judgment recovered against the
administrator of a deceased person in one state is no evidence of
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debt, in a subsequent suit by the same plaintiff in another state
either against an administrator, whdther the same or a different
person, appointed there, or against any other person having assets of the deceased."
A similar view is taken by Gibson, C. J., in Brodie vs. Bickley,
2 R. 431, where it is held that debt will not lie here, against a
domestic administrator, on a judgment obtained in the island
of Barbadoes against the insular administrator.
We may say that it is immaterial whether the administration is committed in the two jurisdictions to the same person or
to different persons. If A is administrator in one, and B administrator in the other jurisdiction, and judgment is recovered
against A, it should be as binding on B, as if B had been admninistrator in both states or countries. There is no presumption
that A was less diligent and efficient, in defending the suit
against him, than B would have been.
The conclusion then is, that, as the only credit given in
Mdaryland to the judgment there, is the attribution to it of conclusiveness as to the liability of the Maryland assets, taking this
view of it in Pennsylvania, is not denying to it full faith and
credit.
The view of the court below, that the judgment of $200 on
the Maryland judgment, can be shown is entirely sound. To
prove payment after a judgment has been recovered is not to
impeach its conclusiveness when recovered. How could it be conclusive with respect to future occurrences?
For the reason given, we must dissent from the decision
reached by the learned court below supported by its interesting
discussion, and the judgment must be
REVEWED with v. f. d. n.

HENDERSON Ys. BLING
Ejectment-Failure to Call Subscribing Witnesses-Burden
Proof of Title-Evidence---Best and Secondary Evidence.

of

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Ejectment for land that had belonged to John Henderson, the
father of the plaintiff, but for which Bling produces a deed, purporting to have been executed by the father. Bling called six
persons who said they knew the handwriting of John Henderson,
and that the signature to the deed was written by him. There
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were two subscribing witnesses who were not called, and
mot calling of whom was not explained. The court rejected
deed. Verdict for the plaintiff.
'Douglas for Plaintiff.
Duirnin for Defendant.

the
the

OPINION OF THE COURT.
XM IEDMAIN, J.-This case requires for our consideration,
a Thorough understanding of the rule of evidence as to the admnissability of Best and Secondary evidence. An attempt is being made to prove the validity of a deed to which there are two
subscribing witnesses, and the grantor of which is deceased. The
proof of the validity is confined to the handwriting of the grantor, which the defendant attempts to prove by the testimony of
six persons who claim they know the grantor's handwriting, and
that the handwriting on the deed is that of the grantor.
The
lower court rejects the deed.
The growth of the law as to the calling of subscribing witnesses has been a slow and gradual one. In this state, it is required that a deed be executed with subscribing witnesses. But in contesting the validity of a deed, the question to be asked is this,
"Was it signed by the alleged maker?" To decide this question, the courts have fixed what shall be the most direct or best evidence; and that which shall be called in case of inability to secure the best, secondary evidence. Greenleaf defines Best or Primary evidence as that kind of proof which, under any possible
circumstances, affords the greatest certainty of the fact in question; and if the execution of an instrument is to be proved, the
Primary evidence is the subscribing witness, if there be one. And
until it is shown that the production of the primary evidence is
out of the party's power, no other proof of the fact is, in general
admitted. I 'Watts, 253; 9 Wheat, 558-563
By the act of attestation, the attention of the witness is called to the mental condition of th egrantor and as to whether he
possessed a sound, disposing mind. Some courts have held, that
the reason for calling the witnesses, is to give the other party an
opportunity of cross-examining them. This court has found
some dicta to the effect that proof of the handwriting of the
grantor is Better evidence of the execution than proof of the
handwriting of the subscribing witnesses. But we are not called
upon to decide this question. We have been unable to find one
authoritative case in support of the contention that proof of the
'andwriting of the grantor is Primary evidence as compared with
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testimony of the subscribing witness, where no attempt is made
to produce them or to account for their absence. The distinction
between Best and Secondary evidence is a distinction of Law and
Not of Fact; referring only to the Quality and not to the strength
of the proof.
Where subscribing witnesses are in being and no attempt is
made to produce them or account for their absence, the court will
properly draw an unfavorable inference from the failure of the
defendant without satisfactory reason, to call the other witnesses
to the deed. 8 Sup. Ct. 405, 61 Sup. Ct. 234. 65 Sup. Ct. 542.
There have been cases, (and the defendant cites 101 Pa. 452
in Support of this contention) that state that an instrument in
writing need not be proved by calling subscribing witnesses.
This court has carefully perused that case and a few more holding similarly to that, and has found that in each case the instrument in writing does not directly come in issue but only comes
incidentally into the question.
It was a collateral undertaking.
This case is based entirely upon the instrument in question and
differs radically from the cases cited.
The case of 217 Pa. 538, cited by the plaintiff is almost identical with the facts of this case, and was similarly decided. It was
decided in the light of the reasoning of this ease and has not been
reversed.
But this court is unable to follow the reasoning of the lower
court in requiring the defendant to prove his deed. He was in posession under a properly executed, witnessed, and acknowledged
deed. In defending his title, he needs merely to come into court,
present his deed and rest his case. It lies with the plaintiff to
disprove the validity of the deed. From the facts before us, we
are unable to see in what way the plaintiff has attacked the validity of the instrument. So we will have to follow the doctrine
as laid down in 75 Pa. 392. Possession is title, and -he having such
title can be ousted only by him who shows one superior to it."
This the plaintiff failed to do.
Judgment is reversed; Verdict for Defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME
Henderson the
and as such owned
conveyed it, in his
land to him. Was
by Henderson?

COURT

plaintiff, was the heir of John Henderson
the land in controversy, unless the latter -had
lifetime. Bling asserts that he conveyed the
he bound to prove the execution of the deed
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The learned court below has held that "It lies with the plaintiff to disprove the validity of the deed," apparently because
"possession is title", which prevails against all that do not ahow
He
a better title. But, the plaintiff is showing a better title.
shows the ownership of his father. The law presumes the continuance of that ownership, till proof is given of its having passed from him. It is not alleged to have passed from him otherwise than through the deed. But, the deed could not pass it, unless it was the deed of Henderson. We come then to the question, was it executed by Henderson?
There are two subscribing witnesses to the execution of the
deed. They were not called. Why, is not explained. Six witnesses professed to recognize the signature as in the handwriting
The court rejected the deed.
of Henderson.
The law in Pennsylvania is, that an attested bond or deed,
cannot be proved,, except by calling the subscribing witnesses, or
on showing that they are dead, or otherwise unobtainable, by
proving their handwriting. After that, only, can proof of the
grantor's or obligor's handwriting be given. Clark vs. Sanderson, 3 Binney 192; Hantz v. Rough 2 S. & R. 349; Iron Co. v.
Lithoid Co., 217 Pa. 538.
As then, the execution of the deed by John Henderson is not
proved, we must -assume that he continued to own the land till
his death, when it devolved under the interstate law upon his
son, the plaintiff.
The judgment of the learned court below must therefore be
REVERSED with v. f. d. n.

PURVIS vs. McDONALD
Assumpsit-Act of 1887-Husband and Wife Joint Makers of
Promisory Note-Husband and Wife Partners.

a

STATBMENT OF FACTS.
John McDonald and wife executed a note for 4500, the price
of a grocery store. The court below held that if John McDonald
was the sole purchaser and his wife a surety there could be no
recovery. If, however, she and he jointly purchased the store,
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each would be liable for the entire sum of $500. A verdict below
was returned for the plaintiff and from this verdict the defendant appeals.
Mervine for Plaintiff.
Polisher for Defendant.
RIGHTER, .J.-The sole question presented in this case is
whether upon the facts stated the wife executed the note with
her husband jointly or whether it was to become an accommodation maker, security or surety for the debt of her husband.
A wife can not become an accommodation maker, security or
indorser, guarantor or surety for another by the Act of 1887.
Also see Stewart vs. Stewart, 207 Pa. 59; Sibley vs. Robertson,
212 Pa. 24; Harper vs. O'Neil, 194 Pa. 141.
Both the counsel for the appellant and for the respondent
cite Fries vs. Mather, 214 Pa. 604. In this case notes were given
by Charles Mather, his wife, Tacie Mathers, and their son,
John S. Mather, to the plaintiff, Fries, and a joint agreement
was made for the purchase of a livery stable. Mrs. Mather claimed that notwithstanding the joint agreement which she had executed, she signed the papers merely as a surety for her husband
and son.
The court charged explicitly and positively that "notwithstanding the apparent contract according to the writings yet if
the jury should be of the opinion that they were a mere device
to avoid the prohibition of the law against a maried woman becoming surety as the defendant testified then they should find
for defendant." With a prima facie case on admitted signatures
cf appellant to writings which could only be defeated by evidence convincing to the jury that the writings were a mere evasion and fraud of the law the judge could have gone no further
than he did. And the jury from the facts shown found for the
plaintiff. In the case at bar the facts are analogous to the above
nentioned case and practically identical. And the upper court,
to which the case was taken on appeal, affirmed the decision on
the ground that it was a case peculiarly for the jury and the
trial judge's instructions were correct.
Again, the language of the facts is unmistakable for they
are "John McDonald and wife executed a note for $500." In
other words John McDonald and wife jointly executed a note for
$500. When two persons sign a note with no facts to show the
intention of one of the signers to become surety for the other
the presumption is that they intended to jointly execute the note
and each would be liable for the full amount of the note.
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Counsel for defendant argued as to a partnership existing
but there is no evidence whatever of partnership in praesenti.
The court can not look into the intention of the parties in futuro.
At the time the note was executed there was no evidence whatever that the husband and wife intended entering into a partnership in the grocery business for profit. The only evidenced prodaced is of a jointly executed note for 4500 for a grocery store
without any affirmative evidence of intention to form a partnership.
The jury Teturned the verdict for the plaintiff and since it
was a case for the jury to decide upon. the facts, judgment must
be rendered on the verdict.
Judgment affirmed.
OPINION OF THE SUI'REME COURT.
We see no error in the instructions of the trial court. The
first was that, if Mrs. McDonald was not a purchaser of the
store, but simply a surety for her husband, who was the sole
purchaser, there could be no recovery against her. This is incontestable. The Act of 1893 is quite explicit.
The next instruction was, if McDonald and his wife jointly
purchased the store, and executed, as such (purchasers the note,
she as well as he, would be liable.
A wife can purchase what she will. She can purchase, alone
or in conjunction With another, becoming co-owner with the
other. Nothing hinders that this other should be her husband.
Why should it? A wife can as well confide her interests to the
husband, as to a stranger. He may be as competent a business
man, as magnanimous, as honest, as any other. Why should she
be allowed to make a co-purchase with every other person and
not with him? Fries vs. Mather, 214 Pa. 304, assumes the
ability of husband and wife to make a joint purchase, and we
see no reason to distrust its wisdom or correctness.
The able counsel for the defendant, Mrs. McDonald, has
inferred from the assumed inability of man and wife to form a
partnership, their inability to buy a grocery store. But, it is not
clear that, in the present state of the law of Pennsylvania, they
!re unable to form a partnership. A wife can be a partner with
another. Why should this other not be her husband? If she had
not the ordinary remedies of a partner against her fellow partner, there would be reason for denying the possibility of her
forming a partnership with the husband. But, seemingly she has
the ordinary remedies. She can sue at law or in equity, her husband as well as a stranger, for wrong done to her property.
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However, decision of this question is here unnecessary.
Nothing indicates that McDonald and wife formed or intended
to form a partmership. The joint purchase of the store did not
make them partners. If they become partners, it will be by doing somethiiing which they have not yet done, and the doing of
v.hich we are not warranted in anticipating.
They may have bad a son, or friend to whom the store
was to be let, and who would carry on the business. They may
have intended that Mr. McDonald alone or that Mrs. McDonald,
alone, should conduct the business. A wife or husband is not
prevented from allowing the husband or wife to have the use
of her or his property, in the conduct of her or his business.
'Ve see no reason for dissenting from the decision of the
learned court below, and its judgment must be
APFIRMEDD.
HENDERSON vs. CHAPLAIN
Ejectment--Statute of Frauds-Specific Performance of a Contract to Make a Will-Revocation of Former Will.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
X, a man 70 years old, agrees with his grandson, Henderson,
to devise to him a tract of land if he, Henderson, would give
him (X) the sum of $300 annually. Henderson entered into a.
bond to make the payments and the grandfather drew up a will
in the usual form devising 'the tract to Henderson but making no
reference to the agreement or bond. After Henderson had made
four annual payments, the grandfather, an old man 74 years old,
quarreled with Henderson and then made another will devising
Ito tract -to one Chaplin. Within a month after the making of
this will the old man died and Chaplain took possession. Now it
is to be decided whether an action of ejectinent will lie.
Davis for Plaintiff.
Delesantro for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
CAROTHERS, J.-Upon condiaeration of the foregoing
facts, the question arising in the case at bar is, "can the plaintff maintain an action of ejectment by showing the parol agreement of the testator to devise to the plaintiff the land in controversy?"
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There is no doubt that "one may enter into a valid contract
to dispose by will, of his property, real or personal, in. a particular way and that such will is irrevocable and the contract will
be specifically enforced;" McGinley's Estate, 257 Pa. 478, 483, and
cases cited by counsel for the plaintiff.
But a promise to devise land by will must be in writing under the Statute of Frauds; Fuller vs. Fuller, 219 Pa. 163. Schroyer
vs. Smith, 204 Pa. 310; Park vs. Park, 39 Pa. Super. Ct. 212.
This leads us to a determination of whether the facts of the
case at bar are such as to take the promise of the testator out of
the operation of the Statute of Frauds. In Fuller vs. Fuller,
supra, the defendant in an action of ejectment failed to justify
his claim to the land only tyecause facts were not sufficient to
take it out of the operation of the Statute of Frauds, i. e., a
promise by the testator to devise to him the lands in controversy. In Schroyer vs. Smith, supra, also an action of ejectment,
the defendant maintained his claim to the land by virtue of a
parol agreement to devise it to him, the court holding that the
defendant's possession of the land and the execution by the
testator of a will by which he left the land to the defendant, was
sufficient to take the promise out of tht Statute of Frauds. The
court said that there was testimony "that the will was made
pursuant to and in conformity with the terms of the contract.
The will, therefore became a writing embracing the terms of the
agreement and satisfied the Statute of Frauds; Brinker vs.
Brinker, 7 Pa. 341." And this in spite of the fact that the will
referred in no manner to the parol contract. In McGinley's Estate, supra, the court said at page 483 "when such contract has
been proved the will becomes a writing containing the terms of
the agreement and satisfies the Statute of Frauds." Proof that the
plaintiff paid and the testator accepted .the annual installments
called for by the contract and the execution by the testator of a
-will in conformity with the oral agreement is sufficient independent evidence of a contract to take the promise of the testator out of the Statute. Thus the plaintiff's claim to the land
is clearly established and we must render judgment for him accordingly.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The first will of X was, in form, nothing but a will. It expressed no contract. "It made no reference to the agreement or
bond." On its face, it was the declaration of a testamentary purpose. Such declaration is changeable. The will is said to be
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ambulatory. A second will would revoke the earlier and inconsist.
ent will.
The will then, contains no reference to any contract, in pursuance of which it was made. We must go outside of it to discover that contract. The contract was, as alleged, that Hendersor should pay $300 annually to X during X's life, and that X
should at his death cause his estate in the land to pass to
Henderson. Henderson made a bond, for the payment of the
money, but containing no reference to the contract. A perusal
of it would not reveal the contract. The will also made no ref-

erence to the contract. A perusal of it would bring the existence
of no contract to light. How then, can we persuade ourselves,
that the contract is manifested by a writing?
We have then, a parol contract for the transfer of land at
X's death by an instrument of a certain form, in consideration
of annual payments of money. Such a contract is not enforcible,
unless it has been exempted from the operation of the Statute of
Frauds with respect to conveyances of land.
Do the equitable grounds exist for the enforcement of the
contract, despite the statute? No possession of the land was
taken, 20 P. & L. Dig. 34702. Nothing to justify the compulsion
to perform the contract exists, save the payment of $300 four
times. But payment of all the purchase money would not be
enough to constrain the court of equity. See cases, 2 Purd, p.
1756 notes; 20 P. & L. Dig. 34730. Henderson can doubtless recover the $1,200 that he has paid with interest, and specific
execution of the contract is not exacted by equity.
There are in this state, several cases, which deal with the
enforcement of contracts to devise. We do not find that they are
distinct or harmonious. In some, possession wis taken of the
land in the lifetime of the devisor, Smith vs. Tuit, 127 Pa. 341;
Tuit vs. Smith, 137 Pa. 35. In the latter case Sterrett, J., says,'
"When the testator has put the devisee in possession of the
land, and the latter has complied with his part of the agreement,
the devise loses its revocability," etc. Possession was given in
Johnson vs. iMcCue, 34 Pa. 180. In Shroyer vs. Smith, 204 Pa. 310,
the devisee was put into possession, in the devisor's lifetime.
The consideration he had paid, too, was one incapable of a strict
money equivalent, viz the abandonment of a trade. The same is
true of Park vs. Park, 39 Super. 212.
In Brinker vs. Brinker, 7 Pa. 53, Gibson, C. J., states that
the will "contained the condition of the contract," and for that
reason held that the parties had done enough to satisfy the
Statute of Frauds. The devisee was in possession of the land be-
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fore the devisor's death and had made valuable improvements,
treating the land as his own until his father's death. In Fuller
vs. Fuller, 219 Pa. 163, the contract to devise was not enforced
apparently because the devisee did not show possession of the
land. It was said also that the will did not coincide with the
contract so as to "fortify" the devisee's title as a memorandum
in writing.
McGinley's Estate, 25q Pa. 478, did not, so far as appears,
involve the Statute of Frauds. The estate was probably only personalty. The value of the service rendered by the devisee, was
difficult to compensate in damages. The proceeding was to probate a will which repealed the earlier will which had been made
in pursuance of the contract. Lewallen's Estate 27 Super. 320,
apparently concerns only personal property, and the Statute of
Frauds is not involved. In Park vs. Park, 39 Super. 212, the dev.see took possession of the land in consequence of the agreement, and abandoned the business he would have pursued (compensation for which abandonment, it would have been difficult to
appraise). It was said that the making of the will was an adequate compliance with the Statute of Frauds, but how, is not apparent.
In Johnson vs. .McCue, 34 Pa. 180, the will was made simultaneously with a bond, 'by which in behalf of the devisee certain money annually was to be paid to the devisor, and the bond
stated that, for failure to make the payments "the grant in the
will is to be null and void, and the lands remain to be otherwise
disposed of." This bond and the will, might well be conceived as
adequately expressing the contract. It was admitted that the
two papers represented one transaction.. The "will" was an inseparable part of the one contract. In the case before us, there
is a bond which makes no allusion to the will. There is a will
which makes no allusion to the bond. The nexus between them
is wholly unwritten. From neither, nor from both could the
agreement that the one (the will) should be made in consideration of the execution of the other (the bond) be discovered.
This agreement is wholly in parol. It is this agreement which
the court is asked specifically to execute.
Despite much vagueness and vacillation in the discussions of
the courts, we must hold that the Statute of Frauds is not satisfied, either by a scriptory expression of the contract, or by the
facts which have been held to "take a case out of" the statute.
F1he able opinion of the court below, fortified, as it seems to
be by dicta and suggestions of learned judges, leaves us unconvinced, and the judgment must therefore be
REVERSUD.
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COMMONWEALTH vs. JOLLOM
lurder-Evidence-Act of May 23, 1887, P. L. 158-Testimony of
Accused as to Intent.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Murder. Jollom was proved to have shot throuh the heart
X, the deceased. He offered himself to prove that he had no intention to kill X. The court excluded the testimony. Verdict of
guilty. Motion for a new trial.
Jester for Plaintiff.
Reap for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
BASEHOPE, J-The question before the court in. this case,
is whether the accused charged with murder may testify as to
his intention not to kill the deceased. The Act of May 23, 1887,
P. L. 158, Sec. 1, reported in P. & L. Dig. Vol 3, Col. 7555, provides: 'Except upon a preliminary hearing before a magistrate
for the purpose of determining whether a person charged with
a criminal offense triable in the court of oyer and terminer ought
to be committed for trial and except also upon a hearing under
habeas corpus for the purpose of determining whether bail
ought to be taken. upon a commitment for murder in the first
degree, or for the purpose of determining in any case how much
bail ought to be required, or for the purpose of determining in
any case whether a person committed for trial ougkt to be
further held and except also upon hearings before a grand jury,
in none of which cases shall evidence for defendant be heard and
except also as provided in section two of this act, all persons
shall be fully competent witnesses in any criminal proceeding
before any tribunal." This case not arising under any of the exceptions it is for us to interpret that part of the statute which
says "all persons shall be fully competent witnesses in any criminal proceeding before any tribunal."
At common law the rule was very well settled that the intent of a party could be shown only by acts of the party and the
circumstances wVich occurred from which it might be inferred,
Zimmerman vs. Maichland, 23 Ind. 474, American and English.
Cyc. 916 .This was the doctrine held in all the states until statutes overruling it were adopted. Even with the coming of statutes
permitting everyone to testify there was considerable doubt as
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to whether an accused could testify as to his intent. The Alabama courts ruled that "a statute making parties competent
witnesses in their own behalf does not enable them to testify as
to their own uncommunicated motives or intention." Burke vs.
State, 71, Ala. 377. With the innovation of statutes on this point
the rule seemed well settled in civil cases that one could testify
as to his intent, 23 L R.. A. N. S. 373; Juniata Building and
Loan Association vs. Hetzel, 104 Pa. 507; Cannell vs. Crawford,
59 Pa. 196; McClelland vs. West, 70 Pa. 183; Frew vs. Clarke,
80 Pa. 170; Sturgeon vs. Stevens, 186 Pa. S50.
The courts in Pennsylvania holding this doctrine in civil
cases applied it to criminal cases not amounting to murder. In
construing the statute supra, the court in Commonwealth vs.
Kauffman, 1 Pa. C. C. 410, said: "The act permitting defendants
in criminal cases to testify removed every form of incompetency
including that arising from defect of religious belief." A defendant who takes the stand in his own defense takes the privilege
cum onere, "his words, his manner, his situation and his interest in the result are all proper subjects of comment and consideration upon the question of his credibility," Commonwealth vs.
Onofri, 18 Phila. 436. When the question of allowing the accused
to testify as to his intent arose in a libel case, the court reviewed
t:Cie authorities as to civil cases and ruled without precedent. In
view of the fact that the defendant is a competent witness in
Pennsylvania, there can be no doubt of the competency of evidence offered as to his intent. 25 Pa. C. . 138.
In homicide cases where the defense is self-defense, the trend
of the decision is that the accused may testify as to his intent.
The court, in Commonwealth vs. Garanchooki, 251 Pa. 247, holding it reversible error "not to permit the defendant to prove a
former difficulty between him and the accused and that the defendant had reasonable apprehension of danger from an attack.
Such testimony had a direct bearing on the relation between the
parties and the condition of their minds when the act was
committed." Commonwealth vs. Ware, 137 Pa. 465; Commonwealth vs. Principatti, 260 Pa. 587. The condition of one's mind
cannot be testified to by another for none other than the accused
can know his intention. His acts may or may not show it and
certainly they should not be taken as conclusive proof of his intent where it is material and his evidence should go to the jury
with the other evidence contradicting or corrobating it. 21 Cyc.
809. Stress is laid on the materiali.y of the 'intent and that be
ing shown there seems to be no doubt that the testimony of the

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
accused is competent. In State vs. Nelson, 118 Mb. 124, the court
said "Where a person charged with crime testifies as to his intent with which he did the act and his testimony is unreasonable
and inconsistent with the experience of mankind, the court is
not bound to believe him and to instruct the jury on his testimony for a lesser degree of the offense charged." The court recognizing the principle that the accused should be allowed to testify as to his intent, but to weigh it with all the other testimony
in the case.
In Pennsylvania the gist of the crime of murder is the proof
cf the intent. Certainly this being the case it is material and
the accused must be allowed to testify. The Supreme Court recognized this principle in Commonwealth vs. Zec, 262 Pa. 251.
"It is competent for a witness to testify to the state of his own
mind as to intent, fear, etc., when that is material and an open
question, but it is not competent for the prisoner to testify
simply that he had a secret undisclosed reason to fear the deceased." Commonwealth vs. Hazlett, 14 Sup. 352.
In the case at bar the offer of the testimony by the defendant that he had no intention to kill X was material and should
not have been excluded.
Verdict set aside and a new -trial granted.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The able opinion of the court below would have convinced
us that the defendant should have been allowed to testify that
he had no intention to kill X but for the language of Walling,
J., in Commonwealth vs. Zec, 262 Pa. 251.
That he can testify to the state of 'his mind generally is
there conceded, to his intent, fear, etc., but it is added, "Where
one intentionally uses a deadly weapon upon a vital part of the
body of another, there is a legal presumption of an intent to kill
which canot be rebutted by the assailant's own testimony that
he did not so intend."
Jollom shot X through the heart. The gun is a deadly weapon.
The heart is a vital part, if by that is meant a part, injury to
which, is very apt to produce death. He does not deny his intention to shoot through the hearf. He den'es he intended to produce
the affect which shooting through the heart usually involves.
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It is possible for a man not to know that the heart is in
the thorax, that shooting the thorax will not improbably be shooting the heart, that injury to the heart will probably produce
death, but
the
denial of the intention
to
produce
death, without evidence explanatory of the ignorance of the
likely result of injury to the heart, is not receivable. The excluded testimony was simply that the defendant had no intention to
kill X. If the cited case is correct it was properly excluded. We
must then reverse the decision of the learned court below.
RLWEVEE
D.

BOOK REVIEW
Federal Income Tax, War Profits and Excess-Profit Taxes,
by George E. Holmes, of the New York Bar. The Bobbs-Merrill
Company, Indianapolis; 1920.
This is a comprehensive treatise on Federal Income and
Profit Taxes, Capital Stock Tax and Stamp Taxes. It includes
not only the statute laws, but all the rules indicated in the
numerous decisions of the Federal Courts on all litigated questions, and the interpretations of the Courts and the Department.
Attention is given to overruled decisions. Mhe book contains
complete instructions as to every conceivable problem.
The mechanical qualities of the book are excellent. The paper is good and the type clear and attractive. The book embraces
1,150 pages.
There is probably no other 'book comparable with this on
its intricate and supremely important subject. Its study can be
recommended without reservation to all who, for themselves, or
for others, are interested in knowing the taxes and their
ineidonee, and in the art of preparing uhassailable returns to the
taxing officers.

